Abstract. This paper introduces an extension A of Kleene's axiomatization of Brouwer's intuitionistic analysis, in which the classical arithmetical and analytical hierarchies are faithfully represented as hierarchies of the domains of continuity. A domain of continuity is a relation R(α) on Baire space with the property that every constructive partial functional defined on {α : R(α)} is continuous there. The domains of continuity for A coincide with the stable relations (those equivalent in A to their double negations), while every relation R(α) is equivalent in A to ∃βA(α, β) for some stable A(α, β) (which belongs to the classical analytical hierarchy).
Introduction
Constructive mathematics, as proposed by Bishop in the spirit of Kronecker, is a proper part of classical mathematics. Intuitionistic mathematics includes a larger part of classical mathematics, together with Brouwer's principle of continuous choice. Philosophical considerations aside, neither approach has been popular with working mathematicians, even though constructive mathematics studies methods of effective approximation crucial to classical applied mathematics while much of classical analysis is concerned with functions uniformly continuous on compact sets.
The first barrier to understanding the constructive approach is its basis in intuitionistic logic, which rejects the classical law of excluded middle in favor of the principle that a contradiction implies everything. Gödel [5] defined a double negation translation which associates uniformly with every theorem of classical number theory a classically equivalent theorem of intuitionistic number theory; for example, "A or not A" translates to the intuitionistically provable "not I am grateful to Peter Krauss for the fundamental idea of classical choice; to Anne Troelstra, Wim Veldman, Jaap van Oosten and Yiannis Moschovakis for valuable comments on an earlier version; to Robert Solovay for the insight and argument which led to significant improvements in Section 5; to the organizers and participants of the Third Panhellenic Logic Symposium (Crete 2001) and the April 2002 Oberwolfach meeting on Mathematical Logic; to the faculty and students of MPLA for a positive logical environment; and to Jean Wyatt for insisting that I finish this work.
both A and not A." Thus intuitionistic arithmetic contains a virtual image of, and is equiconsistent with, classical arithmetic.
Any attempt to extend this method to analysis runs up against the problem that the double negation translation of the axiom of choice is not constructively valid. Most constructivists do accept the axiom of choice for collections of inhabited (as opposed to non-empty) sets; 1 Bishop, following Brouwer, says in [3] : "A choice function exists in constructive mathematics, because a choice is implied by the very meaning of existence." 2 In contrast, the double negation translation of the axiom of choice for countably infinite collections is independent of the principles of constructive mathematics (including the countable axiom of choice itself). In intuitionistic analysis the situation is even worse: Brouwer's principle entails the axiom of choice for collections indexed by ω ω, but contradicts the double negation translation of this axiom.
Kleene and Vesley's axiomatization and development [11] of intuitionistic analysis aimed to demystify Brouwer's ideas, using general recursive functions to interpret the principles of countable choice, constructive bar induction, and continuous choice on spreads. Although the intuitionistic theory FIM of [11] conflicts with classical logic, Kleene's function-realizability proved FIM consistent relative to a common subtheory B of intuitionistic and classical analysis.
The considerable effort of formalizing the theory of partial recursive functionals, function-realizability, and its variant q-realizability, Kleene carried out in [10] using a minimal subtheory (call it M) of B. In addition to tying down his relative consistency proof, this work established that B, FIM, and other suitable extensions of M obey a recursive uniformization rule: If ∀α∃βR(α, β) is a closed theorem of the extended theory S, then there is a recursive total functional Φ[α] for which S proves ∀αR(α, Φ[α]). In [9] and [10] he proposed using these methods to identify theorems of classical analysis which may be added as axioms to FIM, to obtain stronger mixed theories S which are consistent relative to their classically correct subtheories and satisfy the rule. Troelstra [17] obtained a nonclassical extension T of FIM with the same properties.
The main point of the following pages is to propose an informal axiomatic theory A, consistently extending constructive and intuitionistic analysis, containing a virtual image of classical analysis, and closed under Kleene's rule. Within A one can develop naturally the classical and constructive arithmetical and analytical hierarchies, with the advantage that Kleene's rule extends to provide recursive partial choice functionals on classical domains (domains of continuity) such as the collection of all neighborhood functions for total continuous functionals. Using Brouwer's principle, Veldman has shown that the constructive hierarchy, which includes only positive relations, collapses at Σ 1 2 . In A there are relations which belong neither to the classical nor to the constructive hierarchy, but every relation R(α) is equivalent to ∃βA(α, β) for some A(α, β) belonging to the classical hierarchy. This extended hierarchy does not collapse.
The only nonclassical axiom of A, due to Troelstra, depends on a syntactically defined class of relations isolated by Kleene. A formula is almost negative if it contains no disjunction, and no existential quantifier except immediately before a prime formula. In [9] (with [11] ) Kleene showed that if E is any formula in which the scope of every universal function quantifier, and that of every implication, is almost negative, then E is constructively equivalent to the assertion that some function realizes E.
Completing this analysis, Troelstra [17] proposed a generalized continuity principle GC 1 relativizing Brouwer's principle of continuous choice to an almost negative hypothesis. Troelstra's Characterization Theorem (for function realizability) says that in the resulting consistent extension T = B + GC 1 of FIM, every formula E is equivalent to the assertion that some function realizes E; and an arbitrary formula E is provable in T just in case B proves that some function realizes E. By [15] the classical equivalent of B proves that E has a realizing function, if and only if the double negation of E is provable in the theory obtained from T by adding two principles from classical logic: Kuroda's Principle for Numbers DNS 0 and Markov's Principle MP D (or MP PR ; see the next section). This theory T + is consistent relative to its classically correct subtheory and (like T itself) satisfies Kleene's rule.
Peter Krauss [12] proposed using double negation to give a constructive interpretation of classical mathematics, including "classical" versions of axioms of choice and dependent choices. 3 Brouwer's principle conflicts with some forms, but the classical axiom AC Thus we are led to the axiomatic theory A = B + MP PR + DC • 1 + GC 1 , treated here in the spirit of informal rigor. 4 The robustness of Kleene's method encourages further additions; for example, the classical axiom PD • of projective determinacy is consistent with A (and A + PD • satisfies Kleene's rule), if the classical version of B is consistent with dependent choices and projective determinacy. 5 
Preliminaries
The setting is Baire space ω ω with the finite-initial-segment topology. We consider relations on finite Cartesian products of copies of ω and ω ω, distinguishing between a relation and its double negation. Every proof presented 3 Similarly, Troelstra [18] studied "classical" real numbers defined by double negation. 4 Calligraphic capitals will consistently denote informal theories; thus B is the informal axiomatic theory corresponding to B.
5 Interestingly, a constructively stronger form PD of projective determinacy holds intuitionistically for games on ω 2, but not for games on ω ω; see Veldman [20] for the proofs.
here can be formalized in an applied two-sorted intuitionistic predicate logic with decidable equality between terms of type 0, a sufficient finite list of basic primitive recursive function constants with their axioms, full induction over ω, Church's λ (not essential, but convenient) with the appropriate formation rules and reduction axioms, and the countable comprehension axiom ∀x∃!yA(x, y) → ∃α∀xA(x, α(x)), AC 0 ! from which follows the apparently stronger form ∀x∃!αA(x, α) → ∃α∀xA(x, λt.α((x, t))). AC 1 ! This is the minimal theory (1,0,0) of [13] with Kleene's list of function constants from [10] with [11] ; call the corresponding informal theory M. 6 Remark 2.1. All (logical or mathematical) axioms beyond those of M will be stated as additional hypotheses, when required for the proof of a theorem. To help the reader accustomed to classical logic, Lemmas 3.5, 3.6, 3.14, 3.20 and 5.1 are lists of equivalences, and implications whose converses are unprovable intuitionistically, which hold informally in M.
In the spirit of informal rigor, let x, y, . . . vary over elements of ω, and α, β, . . . over choice sequences (elements of ω ω). Finite sequences, and basic neighborhoods in Baire space, are coded using primitive recursive functions as in [10] : Standard surjections map every finite sequence x 0 , . . . , x k−1 of numbers to a number x = (x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) such that x ≥ k and x ≥ x i for 0 ≤ i < k, and every finite sequence α 0 , . . . , α m−1 of choice sequences to a single choice sequence α = λz.(α 0 (z), . . . , α m−1 (z)). The inverse mappings (x) i satisfy (x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) i = x i if i < k, or 0 if i ≥ k, and similarly for (α) j .
Every number w can be interpreted as coding lh(w) values of a function α, where lh(w) is the number of distinct j < w such that (w) j > 0; thus
In particular, α(x) ≡ (α(0) + 1, . . . , α(x − · 1) + 1) codes the first x values of α when x > 0, with α(0) ≡ 1 coding the empty sequence; so α(x)|β if and only if β(x) = α(x). Call w a sequence number, abbreviated Seq(w), if (w) j > 0 for all j < lh(w); then Seq(α(x)) holds for all α, x. A primitive recursive concatenation function
In [10] Kleene associates with each recursive derivation of a partial functional ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k , α 1 , . . . , α m ) a numerical index f coding k, m, and a computation tree algorithm, so that if w 1 |α 1 , . . . , w m |α m where x 1 , . . . , x k , w 1 , . . . , w m suffice to compute the value of ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k , α 1 , . . . , α m ) using the instructions coded by f , then {f }(x 1 , . . . , x k , w 1 , . . . , w m ) codes a computation of that value (which is {f }(x 1 , . . . , x k , α 1 , . . . , α m )), otherwise {f }(x 1 , . . . , x k , w 1 , . . . , w m ) codes an unsuccessful attempt at a computation. Kleene's S m n , recursion, and normal form theorems hold for this coding with constructive proofs.
Using this coding, every theorem E of intuitionistic analysis F IM can be realized, provably in a classically correct subtheory B − (M plus the principle of bar induction) of F IM , by a recursive functional; hence F IM is consistent relative to B − . Moreover, the same functional q-realizes E, provably in F IM ; so F IM has the following constructive closure property. 7 Kleene's Rule. If A(α, x, β) is a relation on ω ω × ω × ω ω with no additional choice sequence parameters, and if ∀α∀x∃βA(α, x, β), then there is a standard general recursive functional Φ : ω ω × ω → ω ω such that ∀α∀xA(α, x, Φ[α, x]). 8 In fact, every extension of M by classically correct axioms or axiom schemas A 1 , . . . , A j which prove their own realizability and q-realizability, and nonclassical axioms or schemas C 1 , . . . , C k such that (i) M + A 1 + . . . + A j proves that each C i is realizable, and (ii) M + A 1 + . . . + A j + C 1 + . . . + C k proves that each C i is q-realizable, is consistent relative to M + A 1 + . . . + A j and satisfies Kleene's Rule. Every theory in which we work here is of this type.
Any theory closed under Kleene's Rule has the property that every relation A(α, x) which is decidable, in the sense that ∀α∀x[A(α, x) ∨ ¬A(α, x)] is provable, is recursive according to the theory. This gives a constructive flavor to the theory even if it includes nonconstructive axioms. 9 This brings up the matter of Markov's Principle, whose variations in the language of analysis include
Most constructivists reject MP, although each version stated here entails its own realizability and q-realizability. All three are equivalent in M (cf. [11] pp. 185-6). Optimistically accepting the principle of unbounded search, our theory A includes MP PR among its axioms; hence all three hold for A.
Any theory which proves MP D evidently satisfies Markov's Rule MR. If ∀α∀x(A(α, x) ∨ ¬A(α, x)) and ∀α¬∀x¬A(α, x) hold, so does ∀α∃xA(α, x).
7 For readability, most metamathematical details are omitted from this paper. Theorem 50, Corollary 57, and Sections 5.6-5.10 of [10] justify all our uses of realizability and q-realizability. See [15] for a summary and relevant applications of this method.
8 By "φ (or Φ) is a standard general recursive function(al)" we mean that the proof that φ (or Φ) is total depends only on the classically correct axioms of the theory. Coding extends Kleene's Rule to A(α 1 , . . . , α m , x 1 , . . . , x k , β) (and also to A(α 1 , . . . , α m , x 1 , . . . , x k , x)), in which case Φ :
The rule relativizes to parameters β 1 , . . . , β n , with Φ (or ϕ) recursive in β 1 , . . . , β n . 9 Kleene's Rule implies that every proof of a disjunction A∨B without parameters provides a guide to a proof of A or a proof of B; every proof of ∃xA(x) without parameters can be improved to a proof of A(n) for some particular number n; and every proof of ∃αA(α) without parameters can be improved to a proof of A({e}) for a particular Gödel number e of a standard provably recursive function. However, if MP (or any other classical axiom not accepted by intuitionists) was used in the original proof, then the choice between A and B, or the identification of an appropriate n or e, may not be intuitionistically effective.
M, B − , B, F IM and T , none of which proves MP D , also satisfy Markov's Rule. 10 It seems to be an open question whether the rule holds for the subtheory of A without MP PR , but it certainly holds for A.
Remark 2.2.
In what follows, both Kleene's and Markov's Rules will be used freely. Thus the results of Section 3, proved in M using both rules, hold also for T and A, but perhaps not for the subtheory of A without MP PR .
Kleene's and Markov's Rules together imply that if A(α, x, y) is decidable, and ∀α∀x¬¬∃yA(α, x, y), then there is a ϕ recursive in the choice sequence parameters of A such that ∀α∀xA(α, x, φ(α, x)). In fact, ϕ(α, x) = µyA(α, x, y) is such a function. 11 Equality between numbers is primitive and decidable, intuitionistically as well as classically. By "equation" we always mean an equation between the values of primitive recursive number-valued functions, so all equations are (recursively) decidable. Equality between choice sequences, defined extensionally by α = β ≡ ∀x(α(x) = β(x)), is undecidable in the intuitionistic theory (there is no continuous decision procedure for equality in Baire space). However, ∀α∀β¬¬((α = β) ∨ ¬(α = β)) holds intuitionistically, and classically expresses the decidability of equality, so there is no real problem here. Rather, as Gödel [5] recognized in the context of first-order arithmetic, there is an opportunity.
The Arithmetical Hierarchies
First we define and compare the constructive and classical arithmetical hierarchies using only reasoning which is correct both constructively and classically, without bar induction or any choice principles (though the countable comprehension axiom AC 0 !, and Kleene's and Markov's Rules, are assumed). 12 The necessary properties of general recursive functions are available by [10] . Intuitionistically, only those relations which are continuous in their choice sequence variables can have total characteristic functions (which may or may 10 The Friedman-Dragalin translation, in conjunction with Kleene's Rule, justifies MR in each case; see [19] or [1] for details. Translating by ¬¬Q proves that these theories, as well as the subtheory of A without the axiom MP PR , also satisfy the "independence of premise" rule IPR 1 : If ¬A → ∃βB(β) holds, where A does not depend on β, then ∃β(¬A → B(β)) holds. Since it conflicts with IPR 1 , MP PR is independent of the other axioms of A. The behavior of relations ¬A(α) as domains of continuity for A seems more natural than under IPR 1 .
11 It is well known that the same Π 0 2 formulas are provable in intuitionistic and classical number theory. Similarly, the same Π 
theorems.
12 In informal axiomatic reasoning, the difference between a rule ("If A holds, then B holds") and an axiom ("If A then B" or "A → B") is subtle but important. In order to apply a rule, one must already have proved the hypotheses outright on the basis of the declared axioms, using only the declared logical principles; thus a rule which holds for a theory S need not hold for an extension (by logical or mathematical principles) of S. Proofs: (a) follows from Kleene's Normal Form Theorem (see the development in [10] with [7] ). To each recursive relation R on ω ω × ω, for example, there is a numerical code e such that ∀α∀x∃!yT (e, x, α(y)) and
where χ T and U are primitive recursive. Given α and x, let w = α(y) for the (least) y such that T (e, x, α(y)); then R(α, x) holds if U (w) = 1, and Definition 3.4. The levels Π 0 n , Σ 0 n and ∆ 0 n of the constructive arithmetical hierarchy are defined as follows. 13 A relation R(x, α) is Π 0 1 if and only if it is expressible in the form ∀yP (y, x, α) where P is recursive; Σ 0 1 if and only if it can be expressed in the form ∃yQ(y, x, α) where Q is recursive; ∆ 0 1 if and only if it is both Σ 0 1 and Π 0 1 . For n > 1, a relation R(x, α) is Π 0 n if and only if it can be expressed in the form ∀yP (y, x, α) where P is Σ 0 n−1 ; R(x, α) is Σ 0 n if and only if it is expressible as ∃yQ(y, x, α) where Q is Π 0 n−1 ; and for all n ≥ 1:
The following general logical principles hold intuitionistically:
, the x may be replaced by α. Lemma 3.6. The following general principles hold intuitionistically, provided that x is not free in B, nor in D(y) (unless y is x).
). Either or both of x, y may be replaced by α, β with the corresponding restrictions.
Proposition 3.7. Every ∆ 0 1 relation is recursive, and conversely, every recursive relation is ∆ 0 1 . Proof: Without loss of generality consider a relation R on ω ω × ω such that R(α, x) ↔ ∀yP (α, x, y) and R(α, x) ↔ ∃zS(α, x, z), where both P and S are recursive. By Proposition 3.2(b) with Lemmas 3.5(g), 3.6(f) and 3.5(a):
Since ∀α∀x¬(R(α, x)∧¬R(α, x)) holds, and the relation ¬P (α, x, y)∨S(α, x, y) is decidable by Proposition 3.2(c) and (a), Markov's Rule gives
Hence by Kleene's Rule there is a recursive functional ϕ such that
and we have R(α, x) ↔ S(α, x, ϕ(α, x)). The converse is trivial. 2 Proposition 3.8. For every n ≥ 1:
Choose the first equivalent if R is Σ 0 n , or the second if R is Π 0 n . 2 The constructive arithmetical hierarchy consists of all positive arithmetical relations, those definable from recursive relations using only ∧, ∨ and number quantifiers. 15 Even very simple positive arithmetical relations such as
place higher in this constructive hierarchy than they do in the standard classical hierarchy; see the remark following the proof of Proposition 7.2 below. 16 By 14 The formal restriction "x is not free in B" translates into the obvious condition on relations. In Lemmas 3.5, 3.6, 3.14, 3.20 and 5.1 it is understood that any variables other than the restricted ones may appear in A, B, C, . . . .
15 Wim Veldman's [20] , [21] , [22] study the constructive Borel and projective hierarchies from a strictly intuitionistic point of view. 16 A strict intuitionist would not accept that argument, which requires Markov's Principle, but he or she would not be able to show that this R(α) is Π 
and so by Lemma 3.5(d) and (g):
Another exercise in intuitionistic logic establishes
This suggests the following definitions.
Definition 3.9. Let∃ abbreviate ¬¬∃. Then∃x,∃α are the classical existential quantifiers.
Definition 3.10. The levels of the classical arithmetical hierarchy are defined as follows. A relation R(x, α) isΠ 0 1 if and only if it is expressible in the form ∀yP (y, x, α) where P is recursive;Σ 0 1 if and only if it can be expressed in the form∃yQ(y, x, α) where Q is recursive. For n > 1, a relation R(x, α) isΠ 0 n if and only if it can be expressed in the form ∀yP (y, x, α) where P isΣ 0 n−1 ;Σ 0 n if and only if it is expressible as∃yQ(y, x, α) where Q isΠ 0 n−1 ; and for all n ≥ 1:
The ¬¬R(α) in the example above is∆ 0 2 . While its intuitionistic reduction required some thought, theΠ 0 2 andΣ 0 2 equivalents obtained are ∀x∃yQ anḋ ∃y∀xQ with the same recursive relation Q one would naturally get in reducing R(α) by classical logic to ∀x∃yQ and ∃y∀xQ.
Proposition 3.11. Every∆ 0 1 relation is recursive, and conversely. Proof: If R(α, x) ↔∃yS(α, x, y) then ¬R(α, x) ↔ ¬∃yS(α, x, y); now follow the proof of Proposition 3.7, observing for the converse that∃zR(α, x) ↔ ∃zR(α, x) (because ¬¬R(α, x) ↔ R(α, x)). 2 Proposition 3.12. For every n ≥ 1:
is classical arithmetical if and only if R can be defined from equations using only ∧, ¬ and universal number quantifiers ∀x.
Lemma 3.14. The following principles hold intuitionistically, provided that x is not free in D(y) (unless y is x).
(g)∃x∃yC(x, y) ↔∃x∃yC(x, y). Either or both of x, y may be replaced by α, β with similar restrictions. Case 1. R(α, x) is a conjunction of two relations belonging to the classical arithmetical hierarchy; by Prop. 3.12 we may assume they are bothΠ 0 m for some m. Lemmas 3.6(f) and 3.14(d) reduce R(α, x) inductively toΠ 0 m form. Case 2. R(α, x) is the negation of a relation in the classical arithmetical hierarchy. Use Lemma 3.14(a),(b),(e) and (f) with Prop. 3.2(b),(c).
Case 3. R(α, x) is ∀yS(α, x, y) where S belongs to the classical arithmetical hierarchy. By Prop. 3.12 we may assume S(α, x, y) isΣ 0 m for some m; then R(α, x) isΠ 0 m+1 . 2 Not all classical relations are (recursively) decidable; an easy but important counterexample is ∀x α(x) = 0. However, every classical relation is equivalent to its double negation, and this explains the terminology.
Proposition 3.17. Every classical arithmetical relation is stable.
Proof. By induction on n ≥ 1 using Proposition 3.2(b) with Lemma 3.14(b), (e) and (f): every relation inΣ 0 n ∪Π 0 n is stable. Now use Lemma 3.15. 2 Proposition 3.18. The classical arithmetical hierarchy is proper. That is,
Proof: Each level of the classical arithmetical hierarchy contains a complete enumerating relation for that level; just replace each ∃ by∃ in the complete relation for the corresponding level of the standard arithmetical hierarchy, given by Kleene's enumeration theorem for the coding of [10] . Adapting the usual diagonal arguments, this hierarchy cannot collapse in a consistent theory, so Proposition 3.12 gives the result. 2
To justify a similar statement for the constructive arithmetical hierarchy we need more axioms; cf. §5.
The decision to replace ∃ by∃ while retaining ∀ may appear arbitrary. According to the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation, ∀xA(x) implies that there is a single algorithm which establishes A(x) for every x, while ¬¬∀xA(x) and ∀x¬¬A(x) are successively weaker constructive assertions. The fact that ¬¬∀¬¬ is intuitionistically equivalent to ∀¬¬ suggests the following definition.
Definition 3.19. Let∀x abbreviate ∀x¬¬, and let∀α abbreviate ∀α¬¬. Theṅ ∀x and∀α are the classical universal quantifiers.
Proposition 3.20. The following logical principles hold intuitionistically, as do the corresponding ones with α in place of x and/or β in place of y.
Hence it makes no difference for the results of this section if each ∀ is replaced by∀ in Definitions 3.10 and 3.13.
Axioms of Countable and Dependent Choice
Consider first the countable axiom of numerical choice
The constructive interpretation of ∀x∃y more than justifies the conclusion, indeed an α must be provided directly by any acceptable verification of the hypothesis. Essentially as Peter Krauss observed in an unpublished manuscript [12] which has received less attention than it deserves, what the classical mathematician means by AC 0 can be expressed intuitionistically bẏ
The∃ in the hypothesis introduces indeterminacy, so that each correlation of a y to an x may be the result of a separate unspecified process; the∃ in the conclusion preserves this indeterminacy while asserting the impossibility (based on the hypothesis) of proving that no α satisfies∀xA(x, α(x)). Either, but not both, of the classical quantifiers in the hypothesis could be replaced by its constructive counterpart without changing the meaning; both quantifiers in the conclusion are essentially classical. Alternatively, AC • 0 could be stated
Beginning with the stronger constructive principle of countable choice ∀x∃αA(x, α) → ∃β∀xA(x, λy.β(x, y)), AC 1 similar considerations justifẏ ∀x∃αA(x, α) →∃β∀xA(x, λy.β(x, y)) AC • 1 and its alternative version AAC • 1 . The converses of all four choice axioms are provable by intuitionistic logic.
Proof of (a): Assume ∀x∃yA(x, y), and define B(x, α) ≡ A(x, α(0)). Then ∀x∃αB(x, α)) (for each x, take α to be the constant sequence with value y from the hypothesis of AC 0 ), so by AC 1 there is a β satisfying ∀xB(x, λy.β(x, y)), and then α = λx.β(x, 0) satisfies the conclusion of AC 0 . (b) is similar. ∀x¬¬A(x) → ¬¬∀xA(x), DNS 0 whose converse holds in intuitionistic logic. While the corresponding type-1 principle ∀α¬¬A(α) → ¬¬∀αA(α) conflicts with continuity, its special case
follows from DNS 0 using AC 0 and MP PR . In the presence of AC 0 , DNS 0 is equivalent to the schema obtained by strengthening the∀x in the conclusion of AC • 0 to ∀x. 17 Although DNS 0 proves its own realizability and q-realizability, it is essentially a logical principle rather than a mathematical one. 18 For this reason we do not treat DNS 0 as an axiom schema, preferring the classical principles of countable and dependent choices which suffice to develop classical second order arithmetic. 19 Proposition 4.2. Assuming AC 1 , every relation R(α, x) in the constructive arithmetical hierarchy is expressible in the form ∃β∀yA(α, x, β(y)) where A is recursive.
Proof. Since R ↔ ∃β∀yR for fresh variables β and y, the proposition holds for R recursive. If R is Π 0 1 , then for some recursive relation Q: R(α, x) ↔ ∀yQ(α, x, y) ↔ ∃β∀yQ(α, x, lh(β(y)))
with a recursive length function lh. If R is Σ 0 1 , then for some recursive Q:
Now suppose R is Σ 0 n+1 where the proposition holds for Π 0 n . Then by the induction hypothesis there is a recursive relation B such that
17 If ∀x¬¬A(x) then ∀x∃y[(y = 0) ∧ A(x)], so ¬¬∀xA(x) by the strengthened classical choice schema.
18 DNS 0 is a discrete countable generalization of the intuitionistically correct ¬¬A∧¬¬B → ¬¬(A ∧ B). Expanding on the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation, one could argue that given a proof, uniform in x, of the impossibility of proving that A(x) is unprovable, then a proof of the impossibility of ever proving ∀xA(x) would be an unacceptable limitation on the future development of constructive mathematical practice (which should never, according to Brouwer, be considered as fixed).
19 AC where
It remains to show that if the proposition holds for Σ 0 n then it holds for Π 0 n+1 . Suppose R(α, x) ↔ ∀zQ(α, x, z) where Q is Σ 0 n . Using AC 1 with the induction hypothesis there is a recursive relation B so that R(α, x) ↔ ∀z∃γ∀yB(α, x, z, γ(y)) ↔ ∃β∀z∀yB(α, x, z, λt.β(z, t)(y))
where A is recursive, since the coding satisfies ((y) 0 , t) < y for all 0 ≤ t < (y)
1 , every relation R(α, x) in the classical arithmetical hierarchy can be expressed in the equivalent forms∃β∀yA(α, x, β(y)) and∃β∀yA(α, x, β(y)) where A is recursive, and also in the equivalent forms ∀β∃yB(α, x, β(y)) and∀β∃yB(α, x, β(y)) with a recursive B.
Proof. The first statement follows by the method of the previous proof, using 
and its classical versioṅ
which expresses part of the force of classical uncountable choice.
Each of the four dependent choice axioms can be relativized to an arbitrary hypothesis, e.g.
The classical counterparts RDC • 0 , RDC • 1 replace each ∃ by∃, and (at least) the ∀y by∀y. In the context of B + MP each proves its own realizability and q-realizability, so each is compatible with T + .
Proof of (a): Assume ∀x∃βA(x, β). Then ∀α∃βC(α(0), β) where
By mathematical induction, ∀x(γ) x (0) = x. Define β = λt.(γ) (t) 0 +1 ((t) 1 + 1)) (using AC 0 !). Then ∀xA(x, λy.β(x, y)), satisfying the conclusion of AC 1 . The proof of (b) is similar, with appropriate double negations; and (c),(d) need no comment. As far as we know, the converse to each part is an open question for M; see the next section for further relevant connections. 2
Now we turn to bar induction and continuous choice, the specific contributions of intuitionistic analysis. As we shall see, a semi-classical approach to bar induction has powerful consequences.
Bar Induction: Variations and Applications
Brouwer's analysis of the structure of ω ω led him to accept a form of induction up to any countable ordinal. The Kleene-Brouwer ordering effectively associates with each tree on ω, each of whose branches is effectively finite (or "barred"), a well-ordering of countable length. Any proof by bar induction over the tree can be recast as a proof by induction along the countable wellordering. Infinite ordinals never explicitly enter the picture, and yet by means of truncated trees (or "stumps") Brouwer was able to work effectively within Cantor's second number class.
Effective bar induction works like this. Given a relation R(w) such that ∀α∃!xR(α(x)), and a property A(w) of sequence numbers satisfying (i) ∀w(R(w) → A(w)), and (ii) A "propagates back . . . across the junctions" ([11] p. 48) in the sense that if ∀sA(w * s ) then A(w), then A holds at the root , and at every node w which is "not past secured" with respect to the "bar" R (that is, every w with no proper initial segment satisfying R). This form of bar induction is expressed by Kleene's axiom
As always, parameters of both types are allowed. The ∃!x cannot be weakened to ∃x without conflicting with Brouwer's principle of continuous choice.
Alternative versions, requiring the bar to be decidable or monotone rather than thin, are discussed in [11] ; monotone bar induction is stronger in the absence of continuity assumptions. One alternative assumes the bar is determined explicitly by a choice sequence:
The proof that BI 1 is equivalent to BI! by AC 0 ! is an exercise for the reader. Note that AC 0 ! asserts the constructive existence of every number-theoretic function effectively definable in the two-sorted language; in this sense our minimal theory M goes far beyond arithmetical comprehension. The bar axiom BI! insures that ω ω does not consist entirely of recursive functions ([11] Lemma 9.8), even though (by Kleene's Rule) only recursive functions can be proved outright to exist constructively.
To further confuse the issue, F IM (which includes BI!) is consistent with there being no non-recursive number-theoretic functions ( [14] ); thus if a sentence of the form∃σE(σ) is provable in F IM , then∃σ[GR(σ) ∧ E(σ)] is consistent with F IM (where GR(σ) expresses "σ is general recursive"). In order to faithfully represent (in the intuitionistic context) all classically definable number-theoretic functions we need more axioms, which must be classically correct but consistent with the principles of intuitionistic analysis. Consider, for example, stronger versions of the bar axiom.
The strongest classical version of BI! consistent with continuity is
The strongest classical version of BI 1 consistent with continuity is
The first two are classical choice principles in disguise, while the third combines MP 1 with BI 1 and best expresses classical bar induction.
Lemma 5.1. The following logical principles hold intuitionistically, provided that x is not free in A or ∃yC(y):
∀x(B(x) →∃yC(y)) →∃yC(y).
The corresponding principles with α, β instead of x, y hold with similar restrictions. In addition, for numbers only:
Proofs. (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) are straightforward. For the backward direction of (c) assume A →∃xB(x) and (toward a contradiction) ¬∃x(A → B(x)); then ∀x¬(A → B(x)) and so ∀x(¬¬A ∧ ¬B(x)), hence ¬¬A and ∀x¬B(x). But by the main hypothesis, ¬¬A → ¬∀x¬B(x). Contradiction. The forward direction follows from (b) by double negation with Lemma 3.5(e). We leave (g), (h) and (i) as exercises. 
Given such a β, if α = λx (β(x+1)) x − · 1 then ∀xA(α(x)) and hence ∀x¬R(α(x)) by the second hypothesis of BI • . Then∃α∀x¬R(α(x)) by Lemma 5.1(f), contradicting the first hypothesis. Hence ¬A( ).
To derive AC • using ABI • , assume ∀x∃yB(x, y) and let R(w) ≡ ∃y < lh(w)¬B(y, (w) y − · 1),
A(w) ≡ ∀y < lh(w)B(y, (w) y − · 1).
The hypotheses of ABI • hold, and the conclusion implies∃α∀xB(x, α(x)).
To show that BI • 1 entails MP 1 , assume∃xβ(x) = 0. By AC 0 ! there is a ρ such that ρ(w) = 0 ↔ Seq(w) ∧ β(lh(w)) = 0. Now apply BI • 1 with A(w) ≡ Seq(w) ∧ ∃xβ(x) = 0. 2
The next theorem follows from a recent result of Solovay, on the negative interpretability in B + MP 1 of a theory with classical logic, BI 1 , primitive recursive functions, and an axiom ensuring that ω ω is closed under the Turing jump. In the current context his key lemma reads as follows.
Lemma 5.3 (Solovay). Assuming
Rather than simply assuming Solovay's lemma, we illustrate the use of BI • For (c), adapting Solovay's proof, assume ("for∃-elimination" as Lemma 5.1(f) suggests) that for some β not free in B(x, y, α),
Our aim is to show∃γ∀x[γ(x) = 0 ↔ ∀yβ((x, y)) = 0]. Equivalently, using the logical lemmas with the decidability of equations, we shall derive a contradiction from the assumption (⋆):
Define ρ(w) = 0 if Seq(w) and for some j < lh(w), either (i) (w) j = 1 and ∃y < lh(w) β((j, y)) > 0, or (ii) (w) j > 1 and β((j, (w) j − · 1)) = 0 ∨ ∃y < (w) j − · 1 β((j, y)) > 0, otherwise ρ(w) = 1. Define
The assumption (⋆) implies ∀γ∃xρ(γ( , ζ 1 , α) , . . . , A n (x, ζ 1 , . . . , ζ n−1 , α) is arithmetical, ζ j is not free in A j for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and x, ζ 1 , . . . , ζ n are not free in B(α) or C(α), and if
is classical, the conclusion may be strengthened to B(α) → C(α).
Proof. By the theorem with Lemma 5.5(a), for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n:
Hence by induction on n using Lemmas 3.6 and 5.1,
which is equivalent by coding with Lemma 3.14(g) tȯ
The result now follows by intuitionistic logic. 2 
for the classes of Σ 0 1 and Π 0 1 relations of y, α respectively. Let E 1 (x, α) be the diagonal relation R 1 (x, x, α), and assume for contradiction that for some e, ∀α∀x(E 1 (x) ↔ P 1 (e, x, α)). Then E 1 (e, α) ↔ ¬E 1 (e, α), a contradiction. So
Second Step. n = 2. Again by the Normal Form Theorem, let
Consider E 2 (x, α) ≡ R 2 (x, x, α). Assume for contradiction that for some e, ∀α∀x(E 2 (x, α) ↔ P 2 (e, x, α)). Then ¬E 2 (e, α), so E 2 (e, α) by MP PR , an impossibility. Hence E 0 2 is not Π 0 2 . Similarly by MP PR , F 2 (x, α) ≡ P 2 (x, x, α) is not Σ 0 2 . Induction Step. n = k + 2. Let R n (x, y, α) be complete Σ 0 n and P n (x, y, α) be complete Π 0 n , so there are a Σ 0 k relation C(x, y, z, u, α) and a Π 0 k relation D(x, y, z, u, α) such that R n (x, y, α) ≡ ∃z∀uC(x, y, z, u, α), P n (x, y, α) ≡ ∀z∃uD(x, y, z, u, α).
Assuming BI •
1 , by Theorem 5.6 with Lemma 5.5:
Assume (for∃-elimination) that γ and δ are such characteristic functions of C(x, y, z, u, α) and D(x, y, z, u, α) with respect to x, y, z, u. Then R n (x, y, α) ↔ ∃z∀u(γ((x, y, z, u)) = 0), P n (x, y, α) ↔ ∀z∃u(δ((x, y, z, u)) = 0).
The Second
Step shows that
n . Since these conclusions are negative and do not involve γ, δ explicitly, by the previous corollary E n (x, α) is not Π 0 n and F n (x, α) is not Σ 0 n . 2 Corollary 5.9. Assuming BI • 1 , if P (x, γ, w) and Q(x, γ, w) are primitive recursive relations then
so every number-theoretic relation which is∆ 1 1 -definable (perhaps with choice sequence parameters) has a classical characteristic function.
Proof. Omitting the parameter γ for readability, our assumption becomes
From (1) by Lemma 3.14(e) with ∀x¬(A(x) ∧ ¬A(x)), ∀x¬(∃α∀zP (x, α(z)) ∧∃β∀zQ(x, β(z))).
By Lemma 3.5(b)(d) each∃ can be replaced by ∃, so by Lemma 3.6(b)(f),
and then by Prop. 3.2(b),
We assume BI • 1 with its consequences MP 1 and Corollary 5.7. If u, v, w, z are sequence numbers with lh(u) = lh(v) and lh(w) = lh(z),
Since being good for x is an arithmetical property, we may assume for∃-elimination that
Fact 1: For every x and n there are u, v with ζ((x, u, v)) = 0 ∧ lh(u) = n. If for some x, n there were no such u, v, then for every α and β: ¬∀yP (x, α(y)) and ¬∀zQ(x, β(z)), whence ¬A(x) ∧ A(x) by (1), a contradiction. Now use MP 1 .
Hence for each x, n there is a least (in the natural ordering of integer codes for pairs) (u, v) such that lh(u) = lh(v) = n and (u, v) is good for x. Let η(x, n) (abbreviating η((x, n))) be this n-best pair for x, and for each x, n, k define
is good for x. For boundedness, assume ∀m∃nξ(x, n, k) > m. Suppose α, β are such that ∀yP 1 (x, α(y)) ∨ ∀zQ 1 (x, β(z)); then for every n, (α(n), β(n)) is good for x, so ∀n ξ(x, n, k) ≤ (α(k), β(k)), contradicting our assumption. Hence
For∃-elimination, assume
By MP 1 with Fact 2, for each x, k there is a least m such that φ(x, k, m) = 0. Denote the least such m by ψ(x, k).
Fact 3: For every x and k,∃m∀n ≥ m[ξ(x, n, k) = ψ(x, k)] and therefore ψ(x, k) ≻ ψ(x, k + 1). If some x, k failed to satisfy the first statement, then because ∀n[ξ(x, n, k) ≤ ψ(x, k)] we would have ∀m∃n ≥ m[ξ(x, n, k) < ψ(x, k)], so ∀nξ(x, n, k) < ψ(x, k) by Fact 2, contradicting the definition of ψ(x, k). The second statement follows from the first by (4). Note: ψ(x, k) is good for x.
Given x, let (α, β) be the unique pair such that ∀k
We have proved ∀x[A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)] from (1) under the assumption that ζ, η, ξ, φ, ψ exist satisfying (3), (4), (5), and so forth. Hence by Corollary 5.7 we have proved that (1) implies ¬¬∀x[A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)]. 20 2 Remark 5.10. Before leaving this subject we should observe that, assuming AC • 0 , every classical analytical relation is classically decidable with respect to its number variables; from this point of view, BI • 1 is weaker than the weakest classical choice axiom considered here. Assuming AC 0 and DNS 0 (both of which hold in A), every analytical relation is classically decidable with respect to its number variables. It follows that no analytically definable sequence is absent from the continuum according to A, even though only the provably recursive sequences are constructively present.
Axioms of Continuous Choice and Domains of Continuity
Brouwer's mathematical notoriety rested mostly on his assertion that every total function on ω ω is continuous in the Baire space topology. In [11] Kleene stated as an axiom schema a strong principle of continuous choice which he called "Brouwer's Principle for Functions." Kleene's version uses a choice sequence to code both a continuous functional and its modulus of continuity. Following his original notation, we define
Thus λα.{σ}(α) is a continuous partial function from ω ω to ω, defined on sequences α for which ∃yσ(α(y)) > 0; if defined, the value of {σ}(α) is one less than σ(α(y)) for the least such y. Similarly, λα.{σ}[α] is a continuous partial function from ω ω to ω ω whose value on α is the partial function whose value on x is one less than σ( x * α(y)) for the least y which gives a positive value to this auxiliary total function of x, α and y, if such a y exists. 21 As in [10] but using ↓ instead of Kleene's !, {σ}(α) ↓ abbreviates ∃yσ(α(y)) > 0, and
Lemma 6.1. Assuming MP PR , AC 0 and DNS 0 , the principle DNS 1 holds:
Proof. Given R, consider the relation B(w, y) which holds if and only if (i) y = 0 and w codes a sequence such that R(u) holds for some initial segment u of w (possibly w itself); or (ii) y > 0 and y + 1 codes a sequence such that R(w * (y + 1)) but R(u) does not hold for any proper initial segment u of w * (y + 1).
Assume (⋆): ∀α∃xR(α(x)). Then ∀w[Seq(w) →∃!yB(w, y)]. (Given w, consider the function α 0 such that α 0 (lh(w)) = w and α 0 (y) = 0 for y > lh(w). By hypothesis∃xR(α 0 (x)) and so by Lemma 5.1(i)∃yB(w, y), and if the y exists it must be unique.) By Lemma 5.1(c), ∀w∃y(Seq(w) → B(w, y)); and by AC 0 with DNS 0 :∃β∀w(Seq(w) → B(w, β(w))) and so∃β∀α∀xB(α(x), β(α(x))). Hence by (⋆):∃β∀α[∀xB(α(x), β(α(x))) ∧∃xβ(α(x)) = 0], and by MP PR thė ∃x may be replaced by ∃x. But then∃β∀α∃xB(α(x), 0) with the ∃β superfluous, so by the definition of B at last ¬¬∀α∃xR(α(x)). 2 Proposition 6.2. Assuming MP PR , AC 0 and DNS 0 , The intuitionistic theory F IM of [11] is B + CONT 1 . By [11] and [10] , F IM is consistent relative to B and satisfies Kleene's Rule.
Among the many consequences of CONT 1 are
which implies CONT 1 ! (like CONT 1 but with ∃!β instead of ∃β) and "weak continuity"
Weak continuity is equivalent to CONT 0 by monotone bar induction (but not by BI! or BI 1 ).
Brouwer's principle relativizes to closed subsets of ω ω called "spreads", but not to arbitrary domains. Troelstra [17] found an optimal relativization which he called "Generalized Continuity"
where A(α) must be expressible in almost negative form. Since α(0) = α(0) is almost negative, CONT 1 follows immediately from GC 1 .
Definition 6.4 (Kleene).
A relation R is almost negative if and only if R can be expressed without ∨, and without ∃ except in parts of the forms ∃x(s = t) and ∃α(s = t) with s, t of type 0. 23 Theorem 6.5 (Troelstra) . T = B + GC 1 is consistent relative to B, and is closed under Kleene's Rule.
To give an idea of the usefulness of the continuity principles, here are some elementary applications. More will appear in the next sections. 22 One could argue that Brouwer's original intention is more accurately expressed by the corresponding statement CONT 1 ! with ∀α∃!βA(α, β) as hypothesis, where ∃! means "there is exactly one," but the restricted expressibility of our language and the intuitionistic acceptability of countable choice support Kleene's version.
23 See [8] . Equivalently, by the Normal Form Theorem, R is almost negative if and only if R can be built from Σ The property of almost negative relations asserted by GC 1 deserves a name, as it has many applications including a mathematical characterization of almost negativity. Proof. Assuming GC 1 , every almost negative relation is a domain of continuity. Consider again the example R(α) ≡ ∀x(α(x) = 0) ∨ ∃x(α(x) = 3). To see that R(α) cannot be a domain of continuity, define ψ(α) = 0 if ∀x(α(x) = 0), and ψ(α) = 1 if ∃x(α(x) = 3); then ψ is defined on R(α) but discontinuous at λt.0, where R(λt.0).
Since GC 1 is consistent with M by Theorem 6.5, R(α) is not almost negative, in particular not classical arithmetical so by Lemma 3.15 R(α) does not belong to the classical arithmetical hierarchy. 2 Proof. The proof of Corollary 25 in [15] , for B and T , extends verbatim. The restriction to A(α) with only α free can be removed; the corresponding but simpler proof of Corollary 10, for Church domains in arithmetic, gives an indication of the method. 
The converse is immediate from the definitions. 2 To see that the R(α) just considered is not constructive Π 0 2 , observe that MP PR reduces Π 0 2 toΠ 0 2 ; but R(α) is not a domain of continuity. Hence, assuming MP PR and GC 1 , the constructive arithmetical hierarchy differs from the standard arithmetical hierarchy beginning at the second level. For a thorough analysis of the role of disjunction in the constructive Borel hierarchy within the context of F IM , see [22] . Proposition 7.3. Assuming MP PR and GC 1 , there exist arithmetical relations which do not belong to the constructive arithmetical hierarchy.
Proof: Let Q(α, x) be the completeΣ 0 2 relation∃y∀z¬T (x, x, y, α(z)). Then Q(α, x) is not constructive ∆ 1 0 . If it were, Proposition 4.2 would provide a recursive A such that Q(α, x) ↔ ∃β∀yA(α, x, β(y)), and hence by GC 1 (since Q(α, x) is almost negative) there would be a σ such that ∀α∀x[Q(α,
Then the → could be strengthened to ↔, and by Kleene's Rule the σ would be recursive, so with a little more work Q(α, x) would be constructive Π 0 2 and so by Markov's Principle alsoΠ 0 2 . Hence for some e: Q(α, x) ↔ ∀y∃zT (e, x, y, α(z)) and by substituting e for x we would have Q(α, e) ↔ ¬Q(α, e). 2 Theorem 7.4 (Wim Veldman). Assuming BI!, AC 1 and CONT 1 , a relation R(α, x) belongs to the constructive analytical hierarchy if and only if it can be expressed in the form ∃σ∀γA(α, x, σ, γ, y) where A(α, x, σ, γ, y) is ∆ 1 0 . Thus the intuitionistic analytical hierarchy collapses at Σ 1 2 , which contains Π 1 2 , so ∆ 1 2 = Π 1 2 . The first proof is in [20] . Without Brouwer's Principle the constructive analytical hierarchy does not collapse, but (because continuous choice is consistent with constructive analysis) Bishop constructivists cannot prove conclusively that it does not. The classical analytical hierarchy, consisting entirely of stable relations, is better behaved. form∃βQ(α, β, x) where Q(α, β, x) is∆ 1 0 . For n > 1, a relation R(α, x) isΠ 1 n if and only if it can be expressed in the form ∀βP (α, β, x) where P (α, β, x) isΣ 1 n−1 ; R(α, x) isΣ 1 n if and only if it is expressible as∃βQ(α, β, x) where Q(α, β, x) isΠ 1 n−1 ; and∆
A relation is classical analytical if and only if it can be defined from equations using only ∧, ¬ and universal quantifiers ∀α, ∀x.
Lemma 7.8. Every relation belonging to
is classical; and conversely, every classical analytical relation R(α, x) belongs to some level of the classical analytical hierarchy.
Proof. The first statement holds because∃ is definable in terms of ∀ and ¬. For the converse, first show by induction on Definition 7.7 that every classical analytical relation has a mixed classical prenex form in which a sequence of universal quantifiers of both types, separated perhaps by negations or double negations, precedes a quantifier-free relation. Working from the outside toward the quantifier-free part, convert each ¬∀¬ to∃, and then contract adjacent quantifiers of the same kind, for example by ∀x∀αA(x, α) ↔ ∀αA((α(0)) 0 , (α) 1 ). Finally, raise the type of every classical number quantifier which precedes a classical choice sequence quantifier, using ∀xA(x) ↔ ∀αA(α(0)) and∃xA(x) ↔ ∃αA(α(0)). 2 Proposition 7.9. Every classical analytical relation R(α, x) is stable under double negation.
Proof. From Lemma 7.8 by the method of proof of Proposition 3.17, with ¬¬∀αA(α) ↔∀αA(α) and ¬¬∃αA(α) ↔∃αA(α). 2 Proposition 7.10. Assuming AC • 1 , everyΣ 1 1 relation R(α, x) can be expressed in the form∃β∀yA(α, x, β(y)) where A is recursive; and everyΠ 1 1 relation Q(α, x) can be expressed in the form ∀β∃yB(α, x, β(y)) where B is recursive.
Proof. If R(α, x) isΣ 1 1 then by Proposition 4.3 with AC • 1 and intuitionistic logic, there is a recursive C such that
Since C is recursive, by the Normal Form Theorem there is an e such that R(α, x) ↔∃β∀y¬T (e, α, x, β(y)).
The proof forΠ 1 1 is similar. 2 Proposition 7.11. For all n > 0:
Hence the classical analytical hierarchy is proper:
Proof. For the inclusion, observe that if α is not among the variables of A,
The noninclusions follow from the Normal Form Theorem as for Proposition 3.18. For example, if R(α, x) is the complete Σ 1 1 relation ∃β∀y¬T (x, x, α, β(y)), then ¬¬R(α, x) is completeΣ 1 1 . If ¬¬R(α, x) wereΠ 1 1 then there would be an f so that ¬¬R(α, x) ↔ ∀β∃yT (f, x, α, β(y)), and then ¬¬R(α, f ) ↔ ¬R(α, f ), a contradiction. SoΣ 1 1 ⊆Π 1 1 . 2 It is straightforward to prove thatΣ 1 n andΠ 1 n are closed under substitution of classical functionals whose graphs areΣ 1 n . The basic representation theorem for Π 1 1 in terms of the Kleene-Brouwer ordering is proved by constructive bar induction, and assuming MP PR , Proposition 7.10 implies thatΠ 1 1 = Π 1 1 . The Suslin-Kleene Theorem is the natural next step.
Chapter 4 of [16] , restricted to the first two types, and with countable ordinals represented by well-founded trees, provides a guide for this basic structure theory. Every result whose proof there is entirely constructive should hold here for both the constructive and the classical hierarchies; classical proofs should carry over here in the classical context only. To motivate this routine work, the following characterization of the domains of continuity suggests applications throughout classical analysis.
The Theory A
It is useful to think of the nonclassical theory A as obtained from a classically correct basic theory by adding the principle of generalized continuous choice. The dependencies detailed above and below make possible a slightly more efficient axiomatization of A directly. First we take the modular approach. Proof. By [15] it is enough to show that B • proves the realizability, and A proves the q-realizability, of the axioms RDC 1 Proof. By GC 1 and Troelstra's characterization theorem for Kleene functionrealizability ( [17] , [15] ), to each R there is an almost negative relation R ′ (β, α, x) (expressing "β realizes R(α, x)") such that R(α, x) ↔ ∃βR ′ (β, α, x). By MP PR , GC 1 and Corollary 6.8, R ′ has an equivalent classical form R • . 2 Corollary 8.5. Let R(α, x) be any analytical relation. In A, the following are equivalent:
(a) R(α, x) is a domain of continuity with respect to α. Corollary 8.6. In A, every relation R(α, x) can be expressed in the form ∃βA(β, α, x) where A belongs to some level of the classical analytical hierarchy. The resulting total analytical hierarchy is proper in A, as for each n > 0:
Proof. By Theorem 8.4 with Proposition 7.11, only the noninclusions need proof. The arguments we give for n = 1 generalize to all n > 0. The first noninclusion will be established absolutely in the sense that it holds in any consistent extension of A. To prove the second noninclusion we use Kleene's Rule (which holds for A); cf. Remark 2.2.
To show that Σ 1 (Π 1 1 ) ⊆ Σ 1 (Σ 1 1 ), let R(α, x) be ∃β∀γ∃yT (x, x, α, β(y), γ(y)), and suppose for contradiction that ∀α∀x[R(α, x) ↔ ∃δ∃ε∀zP (x, α, δ, ǫ, z)] where P (x, α, δ, ǫ, z) is recursive. Then the completeΣ 1 2 relation ¬¬R(α, x) would bė Σ 1 1 , which is impossible.
26 ΛσΛαΛτ (Λ.ρ, (Λ.λt.0, Λx.(φ(x), ψ(x)))) realizes RDC 1 , where ρ, φ, ψ are partial recursive functions defined recursively from σ, α, τ ; and Λσ.Λα.λt.0 realizes DC For the reverse noninclusion, let R(α, x) be ∃β∃γ∀y¬T (x, x, α, β, γ(y)) and suppose for contradiction that A proves ∀α∀x[R(α, x) ↔ ∃δ∀ε∃zQ(x, α, δ, ε, z)] where Q(x, α, δ, ε, z) is recursive. Then we have The theory A is a rich axiomatic structure which invites further exploration. For example, writing σ ⋆ τ for the play of a two-person game (of perfect information) generated when I plays by strategy σ and II plays by strategy τ , the classical Axiom of Projective Determinacy can be stated as 
